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Fund disclosure is an important communication tool between trustees and fund members for
product comparison and credibility verification. We examine what drives Australian not-forprofit superannuation funds to disclose their fund product information to the market. Our
research derives a model that shows how the proprietary costs of disclosure and fund
governance drive the disclosure of information about trustee, investment agents, fees, and
overall practices. The research findings indicate that disclosure costs have a significant
negative influence on voluntary disclosure, while board size has a weak positive relation with
disclosure. Board independence is an unreliable and insignificant explanatory variable for
voluntary disclosure. We discuss how the multi-layer agency relationship and institutional
factors in the superannuation funds industry influence the power of these factors and their
effects on voluntary disclosure.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The superannuation industry is a significant segment of the Australian economy, occupying a
vital role in its pension system and financial markets. While ensuring the long-term
sustainability of Australia’s retirement schemes, superannuation funds also represent
powerful institutional investors who are able to make decisions that can have major impacts
on Australia’s economic development. On 1 July 2005, the Australian Government enacted
new laws allowing employees to choose which fund will manage their contribution. As with
any investment assessment, the decision to choose a superannuation fund relies on market
data and the information disclosed by funds. The Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) provide
guidelines on the way superannuation funds disclose governance and product information via
their product disclosure statements, financial statements and other promotional materials. The
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations (SIS Act) 1994 and the Corporations Act
2001 requires superannuation funds to lodge regular financial disclosure, but the current
disclosure by funds is inconsistent. There is currently a lack of “systematic transparency” in
the superannuation funds industry; specifically, there is a lack of standardised methodology
for the calculation and disclosure format of investment options, risk, return and costs of funds
to provide quality information for any expert analysis (Cooper, 2010). Through our data
collection, we found that although funds are required to disclose their costs, there is no
information being reported to APRA in some cases. For example, some funds that appointed
trustees disclosed zero trustee cost in their financial reports. The management fee and
performance fee are reported in various formats (as a percentage or fixed fee) in funds’
product disclosure statements and the calculation methods differ between funds. Furthermore,
certain fees paid to related parties are not appropriately accounted for in the superannuation
funds industry (Liu & Arnold, 2010). A recent national review of the Australian
superannuation system identifies disclosure as one of the key factors in ensuring
superannuation funds operate effectively (Cooper, 2010). Of special interest is the quality of
the disclosed information. For this paper, we measured the level of voluntary disclosure by
funds using disclosure indices and conducted a cross-sectional analysis of what drives the
level of disclosure for Australian industry and public sector superannuation funds. The
findings suggest important implications for the choice of superannuation funds by employees,
and the way forward in developing disclosure practices in the industry.
We focus on fund-specific factors that drive voluntary disclosure and argue that the
decision to disclose is based on a fund’s proprietary cost and governance arrangement.
Agency problems and information asymmetry arise when the ownership of capital is
separated from the control of decision-making (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). This
agency issue can be applied to equity and portfolio investments such as pension funds
(superannuation funds, used interchangeably). Superannuation funds invest members’ capital
into financial products such as managed fund products. The financial product managers then
act on behalf of the members by choosing the appropriate investment strategies based on the
latter’s mandates, while the capital that is invested remains the property of the members. This
represents an analogous situation to an investment into an exchange-listed equity or fund
where a fund manager invests the shareholders/stockholders’ funds on the latter’s behalf.
With respect to disclosure, in both cases the investors or capital providers will evaluate and
choose the funds based on information provided by the financial institution (fund managers
or superannuation funds). “Agency and structural issues” are especially prominent in the
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Australian superannuation funds that are argued to deter market competition and the
incentives for members to become effective monitors of their contributions (Cooper, 2010). A
stringent regulatory environment promotes better disclosure practices, such as the case in the
banking sector (Munir et al., 2011). Given the vagueness of current regulatory requirements,
disclosure of superannuation fund information relies on the fund insiders (i.e. trustees and
managers, who are the information holders). For this project, we examined the information in
superannuation funds’ annual reports, product disclosure statements, and websites to collect
data for thirteen categories of information that are important in driving employees’ decisions
in choosing a fund to which they would contribute. These categories were selected due to
information availability, and were closely related to a fund’s agency issues, fees and
performance, which were deemed as priorities for comparability between funds (Cooper,
2010). We developed three disclosure indices that measured the disclosure of superannuation
funds’ trustee boards, investment options and agents, and fee information, respectively. An
Overall Disclosure Index, which consisted of the three indices, was calculated to assess the
overall level of information disclosed to current members and potential new members, and
compared to fund peers.
Our results show that trustee board size has a positive but weak effect on overall
voluntary disclosure, and particularly disclosing investment options and agents’ information.
Board independence has a mixed effect on the various voluntary disclosure indices and the
results are not significant. Disclosure costs measured by operating expenses influence all of
the disclosure indices significantly and negatively except trustee board information. Fund
type and size are not significant estimators of voluntary disclosure. We further conduct
robustness checks using additional control variables, including whether a fund offers
accumulation and public offer options, the number of trustee board committees and the
percentage of pensioners in a fund. We find that the explanatory power of disclosure costs is
robust in all indices, while the effect by board size varies. Our results are different to some of
the past findings in the corporate governance and voluntary disclosure literature (Cheng &
Courtenay, 2006; Sanchez et al., 2011), indicating that external factors such as institutional
environment and industry differences have an intimate interplay with internal factors on
voluntary disclosure.
In the next section, we develop the literature review and hypotheses. The third section
discusses our research methodology and the study’s empirical results. The fourth section
provides discussion of the findings, and the final section is our conclusion.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Voluntary disclosure can be driven by both internal (firm-specific) and external (institutional,
regulatory and environmental) factors (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). In this paper, we focus on
how internal factors drive voluntary disclosure in superannuation funds. Disclosure and the
transparency of superannuation funds management are crucial for effective communication
between trustees and their members. These elements have both informative and educational
purposes, with trustees presenting key information and justifying financial decisions to
members. As the laws for superannuation choice are enacted, superannuation funds have a
moral obligation to disclose useful information to facilitate decision-making by current and
potential members. By 2010, since the introduction of the 2005 superannuation choice
legislation, employees have had the choice of more than 196 funds, each providing multiple
investment options. In such an environment, one would expect that the contributing
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employees will opt for superannuation funds that generate the highest returns, charge the
lowest fees, are sustainable with their operations, and disclose information to confirm all of
the above; hence, superannuation funds should disclose this information to the public so they
can make informed decisions. For example, the “MySuper” option is proposed to offer a
default option that standardises a number of features including the transparency of
information that will improve comparability between funds (Cooper, 2010). Currently, there
are two key obstacles that affect how employees make the choice of their superannuation
funds. First, employees already in a fund may have to pay fees to switch to another provider.
Second, a new employee is often encouraged to join a specific superannuation fund provider
nominated by their employer, even though the employee is free to opt for another provider
(Cooper, 2010). The Cooper Review (2010, p. 8) identifies that the “lack of information and
transparency about fees and performance” combined with product complexity lead to the
current weak competitive environment in the superannuation funds sector. In this market
environment, we aim to explain what drives not-for-profit superannuation funds to disclose
information to the market. We focus on examining superannuation funds’ annual reports,
product disclosure, and official websites to gauge the current levels of, and reasons for,
disclosure. We use corporate governance and voluntary disclosure literature to develop our
theoretical framework. We argue that the decision to disclose is a function of proprietary
costs and trustee governance arrangement.
2.1 Proprietary Costs and Fund Type
By disclosing information, funds face the risk of sharing private strategic information of
which competitors may take advantage (Darrough & Stoughton, 1990). More specifically,
disclosure could send signals indicating the value of, and developments within, a firm,
product, or worker (Stiglitz, 1979). Verrecchia (1983) argues that disclosure costs (including
dissemination and proprietary costs) are only incurred if a firm discloses information. On the
other hand, Wagenhofer (1990) shows that the proprietary part of disclosure costs can be
incurred even if a firm chooses not to disclose; this could result in a situation where a rival
firm chooses to act upon nondisclosure signals to gain an advantage. Furthermore, Gigler
(1994) argues that firms can create credibility for themselves, and influence the market and
rivals’ perceptions, to the disclosers’ advantage by voluntarily disclosing high proprietary
information if the information is not verifiable. When information is asymmetrical and
research is costly, information holders (insiders) will choose to exploit information
distribution to fulfil their own objectives; this, in turn, will affect product types, prices,
demand, and supply of information in the market (Stiglitz, 1979). Disclosure is especially
important in markets filled with dispersed ownership structures, where the monitoring of
agents (management) by board of directors on behalf of shareholders is essential in mitigating
shirking behaviours (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency problem in superannuation
funds is widely discussed in a number of past research papers (Drew & Standford, 2003;
Coleman et al., 2006; Bateman & Thorp, 2007; Bryan et al., 2009b; Benson et al., 2011). In
superannuation funds, there is a vast pool of capital providers who do not manage and
monitor their interests directly; this mimics the dispersed ownership structures in the equity
market. The board of trustees, who have a similar role as the board of directors, monitors the
appointment and performance of asset consultants and fund managers who represent the
management of the funds on behalf of the members. Management influences accounting
information, information type, and disclosure frequency based on their self-interest and
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constraints, which include taxes, regulations, political costs, disclosure costs, and the party
with whom they engage (Watts & Zimmerman, 1978; Leftwich et al., 1981).
The superannuation funds industry is divided into five main types: retail, corporate,
industry, public sector, and self-managed. Each type is distinctive in terms of its strategies
and target members. This has strong implications for proprietary costs as they vary among
funds and types of funds. While the operation of each fund gives rise to its fund-specific
proprietary costs, funds of the same type may share some similarities in their kinds and levels
of costs. For example, Liu & Arnold (2010) found that the number of conflicts of interest and
the resultant fees arising from related party transactions were different between retail and notfor-profit superannuation funds in Australia; thus, the level of proprietary costs associated
with voluntary disclosure will differ between fund types. Due to the presence of distinctive
fund type-specific operational strategies and characteristics, funds of the same type may
choose their level of voluntary disclosure collectively as this would reduce the proprietary
costs between these funds. The costs for funds of the same type remain high compared to
other types of funds as the latter will not gain any spill-over benefits from the former’s
disclosure (Simpson, 2008). Wagenhofer (1990) and Gigler (1994) also argue that partial
voluntary disclosure of specific proprietary information will be undertaken if firms can deter
rival advances in the market and achieve their objectives ex ante. Industry superannuation
funds’ advertising campaigns demonstrate this when they draw the public’s attention to the
costs and expenses of their organisations compared with the other types of funds, without
comparing other performance parameters. Therefore, the type of fund affects the level of
voluntary disclosure, and the direction of this effect is based on the type of specificity (i.e.
agency and structural issues, and selection and representation of trustees) that a fund type has.
That is, the higher the level of specificity a fund has, the higher the level of voluntary
disclosure, because disclosing such information will not benefit other fund types.
Hypothesis 1: Voluntary disclosure differs according to fund type.
2.2 Disclosure Costs and Valuation Benefits
Voluntary disclosure incurs costs arising from information collection, administration, and
dissemination, as well as proprietary costs (Simpson, 2008). The decision to disclose
information to the market is based on the trade-off between disclosure costs and potential
benefits derived (Simpson, 2008). We argue that the ultimate objective of a superannuation
fund is to achieve long-term fund growth and sustainability; disclosure can potentially
provide this benefit. Increasing fund size may potentially drive operating and investment
costs down, which is an increased benefit for members. On the other hand, increased
voluntary disclosure may drive operating costs up (due to the need to collect, administer and
disseminate information). Moreover, as discussed earlier, proprietary costs may potentially
increase the costs associated with voluntary disclosure depending on the type of fund and
information being disclosed. Information users who are not familiar with disclosure rules and
regulations are less likely to take disclosed information on face value (Khumawala et al.,
2005). We do not expect the general public to be familiar with disclosure rules and
regulations given that the current body of superannuation regulations and laws are complex
and dissipated in various sources (Donald, 2011). Hence, members will scrutinise the
information disclosed by funds when making their contribution decision. Funds would base
their analysis of this trade-off between costs and benefits on past financial figures. High
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operating costs may influence a superannuation trustee to give priority to reducing costs
through maintaining a low level of disclosure. On the other hand, if past performance shows a
direct correlation between voluntary information disclosure and fund growth, funds may
choose to increase their disclosure.

Hypothesis 2: Disclosure costs are negatively related to voluntary disclosure.
2.3 Fund Governance
The Cooper Review stipulates that governance models should affect all facets of fund
operations and performance (Cooper, 2010). International studies have focused on fund
governance as a critical issue in the management and performance of pension funds (Myners,
2000; Ambachtsheer et al., 2007; Stewart & Yermo, 2008; Clapman, 2007). Depending on
the level of financial literacy, members rely on the trustees to decide on the investment
options from which they could choose from (Gallery et al., 2011). Furthermore,
superannuation trustees appoint asset consultants and fund managers to operate their funds,
while some funds may run an in-house asset management team. Trustees outsourced
substantial fund operations including key decision-making areas such as strategic asset
allocation and performance monitoring to consultants (Gupta et al., 2007; Sy et al., 2008).
Specifically, trustees have the greatest input in selecting an administrator, asset consultant,
setting objectives and risk tolerance, in this order of importance (Sy et al., 2008). Asset
consultants and fund managers have their unique sets of private information that have a
potential impact on fund returns (Drew & Standford, 2003). Trustees play the role of fee
negotiators with asset consultants and fund managers; hence, fund governance models affect
the level of fees and operating expenses passed on to members (Bryan et al., 2009a). This
multi-layer agency relationship complicates the determination of the level of proprietary costs
in the superannuation industry. The proprietary costs may be associated with the ultimate
information holder (namely, the fund manager), then are passed down to the asset consultants
and trustees. At each agency level, information may or may not be fully disseminated at the
discretion of the communicator. In order to perform a thorough assessment of information
asymmetry, quality, and integrity, members will need to infer details from the information
disseminated through the communication chain.
Fund governance measured in terms of the trustee board is an exogenous factor to fund
disclosure, since trustees are currently paid a fixed fee that is not tied to funds’ performance;
our data shows, in some cases, trustee directors perform their roles on a voluntary basis
(unless their fees were not recorded under trustee fees or reported properly in the APRA’s
financial data). We argue that the objectives of the trustees are to maximise the benefits to
members and sustain fund growth and returns. It is the duty of trustees and directors to
minimise the gap between the objectives of the superannuation funds and external agents
with clear mandates and communication policies, effective monitoring, and reviews.
Trustees, not management, are the main holders of information about the operations of
superannuation funds. Hence, we focus on superannuation fund trustees as the information
gatekeepers.
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Board Size
There is no study that empirically examines the characteristics of trustees on voluntary
disclosure. In corporate governance, a larger board is related to better disclosure (measured in
terms of earnings accuracy by analyst coverage) due to more consistent board operations and
communication policies (Cheng, 2008; Byard et al., 2006). In another study, board size is
found to have no association with voluntary disclosure (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006), or the
timeliness of earnings announcements (Bushman et al., 2004). Furthermore, Sanchez et al.
(2011) argue that larger board size influences the effectiveness of control mechanisms and
board monitoring efficiencies. Board size may be affected by fund size, growth rate, and
merger activities. Nevertheless, we argue that, as a trustee board grows, there is an increased
diversification of directors’ expertise, a reduction in monitoring and information costs, and an
improved balance in the representation of members’ interests; all these lead to improved
disclosure policies and practices, and better voluntary disclosure.
Hypothesis 3: Board size is positively related to voluntary disclosure.
Independent Trustees
Board composition is linked to disclosure, and the presence of independent directors can
elicit contradictory outcomes. Where studies find independent directors contribute positively
to the level of voluntary disclosure (Babío Arcay & Muiño Vázquez, 2005; Cheng &
Courtenay, 2006), another argues these directors are negatively related to disclosure due to
the substitution effect between the two (Eng & Mak, 2003). In addition, the degree of
information asymmetry between outside directors and firm insiders (such as the CEO),
affects how the former could contribute to firm value; the high cost of information would
reduce the value of outside directors to a firm (Duchin et al., 2010; Sanchez et al., 2011).
The SIS Act 1994 stipulates that the employer- and employee-nominated trustees must
be equally represented in a fund; independent nomination can then be decided by the trustee
board. We argue that better board independence can lead to a greater level of voluntary
disclosure in superannuation funds. Independent trustees have better professional governance
knowledge that can contribute to better disclosure and communication policies and practices.
In addition, being an outsider, independent directors frequently collect and request
information to perform their roles, this internalises information costs on behalf of fund
members.
Hypothesis 4: Board independence is positively related to voluntary disclosure.
The following section discusses our methodology and the results from testing our
hypotheses.
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3. METHODOLOGY & RESULTS
We focus on trustee governance of the industry superannuation funds (industry
superfunds) and public sector funds, both of which are currently under-researched. The
industry and public sector funds’ combined value of assets under management is the second
largest, following the retail superannuation fund segment in the Australian superannuation
industry. By 2010, these two categories of fund managed almost half of the assets under
management in the sector 1 with assets of AUD$96.6 billion and AUD$218.9 billion,
respectively (compared with AUD$47.5 and AUD$330.4 billion for the corporate and retail
sector funds) (APRA, 2011).
Table 1: Funds Sample Construction
2004
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
All APRA-regulated Industry and public sector superannuation funds
Industry
75
77
71
69
65
63
60
Public Sector
23
23
22
20
20
19
20
2
Funds excluded from the sample (non-surviving funds or information not disclosed )
Industry
13
12
6
4
0
2
1
Public Sector
8
8
7
5
5
5
6
Final sample
Industry
62
65
65
65
65
61
59
Public Sector
15
15
15
15
15
14
14
Total number of funds in the final sample
77
80
80
80
80
75
73

The superannuation fund sample is initially drawn from official data provided by
APRA, the government institution supervising superannuation funds. We started with a list of
all APRA-regulated industry and public sector superannuation funds with more than four
members. This sample excluded pooled superannuation, as well as exempted public sector
superannuation schemes. The sample is further reduced as we excluded funds with nondisclosed financial information or non-surviving funds with fewer than three years of data.
Based on our initial sample, we sought additional information using various sources. These
included annual reports and press releases, which are considered important sources of
information for firms (Gul & Leung, 2009). When selecting and reviewing superannuation
structure and performance, members and potential members rely on the product disclosure
statement (PDS), annual reports, and official websites for information and comparisons
across different funds. We used these sources as the main disclosure channels for funds to
communicate with members and the market. In addition, corporations disclose information on
the internet to reach a wider coverage of stakeholders and provide them with a timely and
broad scope of information (Sanchez et al., 2011). In order to examine the current trustee
governance structures, we collected information on trustee board size and independence. We
also collected information about CEO-Chairman duality and dropped this variable given that
this practice is not present in our sample. The information on superannuation funds
governance is greatly limited and past years’ records are usually not maintained on websites.
Therefore, we collected the governance variables for the financial year 2009. Our sample
suffers survival bias because past records of trustee information, annual reports and PDSs are
1
2

Excluding self-managed funds, pooled superannuation trusts and public sector superannuation schemes.
To protect the privacy of members, APRA did not disclose information on all the funds recorded.
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not maintained for public access by the funds or regulators. Information about trustees and
board composition are fairly stable over a long period of time of at least 5 years (Gupta et al.,
2007; Sy et al., 2008). We obtained industry and public sector superannuation funds financial
data from APRA for the period 2004-2010. From this dataset, we extracted annual data on
fund types, operating expenses and fund characteristics.
Table 2: Definitions of variables.
Variable
Board size (bsize)

Definitions
The total number of trustees per fund.

Independence (pindpt)

The percentage of independent directors per fund.

type

Fund type, where 1 = industry fund, 0 = public fund.

Logopexp09

Natural log of fund’s operating expenses (normalized by fund size) for
the year 2009.

Members09

Natural log of fund’s number of membership for the year 2009.

Size09

Natural log of fund size (end-of-year net assets) for the year 2009.

Board Disclosure Index
(BDI)

The sum of the following, where the highest score is 4 points:
1 = trustee information is disclosed; 0 otherwise.
1 = trustee committee information is disclosed; 0 otherwise.
1 = directors’ names are disclosed; 0 otherwise.
1 = nominator information is disclosed; 0 otherwise.

Investment Disclosure Index
(IDI)

The sum of the following, where the highest score is 4 points:
1 = fund manager information is disclosed; 0 otherwise.
1 = asset consultant information is disclosed; 0 otherwise.
1 = investment allocation information are disclosed; 0 otherwise.
1 = investment option information is disclosed; 0 otherwise.

Fee Disclosure Index (FDI)

The sum of the following, where the highest score is 5 points:
1 = administrative cost information is disclosed; 0 otherwise.
1 = investment management fee information is disclosed; 0 otherwise.
1 = performance fee information are disclosed; 0 otherwise.
1 = withdrawal fee information is disclosed; 0 otherwise.
1 = investment switching fee information is disclosed; 0 otherwise.

Overall Disclosure Index
(ODI)

The sum of BDI, IDI AND FDI:
ODI = BDI + IDI + FDI
Where the highest score is 13 points

Table 2 summarises the variables and their definitions as used in this paper. Board
size (bsize) measures the total number of trustees per fund. Board independence (pindpt) is
measured by the percentage of independent trustees per fund. Fund type (type) is a dummy
variable to indicate whether a fund is an industry fund (value = 1) or a public sector fund
(value = 0). Operating expenses, measured as the average operating expenses weighted by
fund size (total asset value) per member, is a proxy for disclosure costs given the limitation of
financial information reported by the superannuation funds and regulators. We correct for
abnormal distribution in operating expenses, fund membership and size by applying natural
log to the data.
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We follow Sanchez et al. (2011) and develop four unweighted disclosure indices using
binary variables to measure the level of voluntary disclosure of various types of information.
First, the Board Disclosure Index (BDI) measures the level each fund discloses about its trust
and trustee identity, trustee committee structure, and trustee nomination. A point is allocated
to each category of information with the highest score being 4 points and the lowest 0 for this
index. The second index is the Investment Disclosure Index (IDI), which measures whether a
fund discloses information about the identity of its fund managers and asset consultant, its
investment allocation and investment options. A point is allocated if information is found; 4
points being the highest and 0 meaning no disclosure at all. The third index is the Fee
Disclosure Index (FDI) that measures the level of fund disclosure associated with information
of administrative cost, investment management fee, performance fee, withdrawal fee, and
investment switching fee. There are five categories of information for this index where full
disclosure is 5 points and no disclosure is 0. The last index, the Overall Disclosure Index
(ODI) consolidates the previous three indices to give an overall disclosure measure of each
fund. The maximum 13 points indicates full disclosure and 0 indicates no information is
disclosed. The information for the disclosure indices is also collected from PDS, annual
reports and websites for 2009.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of variables.
Mean
bsize
pindpt
fundtype
ODI
BDI
IDI
FDI
logopexp09
members09
size09

8.0000
0.0951
0.8148
10.1852
3.3210
3.2469
3.6173
-8.8899
10.66
13.82

Minimum
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
-12.7169
6.51
9.03

Maximum
17
1
1
13
4
4
5
-3.4402
14.49
17.13

Std. Dev.
2.7548
0.1730
0.3909
3.5147
1.0820
1.2897
1.5777
1.9633
1.76
1.60

Observations
74
70
81
81
81
81
81
75
75
75

bsize represents board size. pindpt represents the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number
of directors on a trustee board. fundtype represents fund type. ODI represents Overall Disclosure Index. BDI
represents Board Disclosure Index. IDI represents Investment Disclosure Index. FDI represents Fee Disclosure
Index. Logopexp09 represents natural log of operating expenses (normalised by fund size) for the year 2009.
members09 represents the natural log of fund membership in 2009. size09 represents the natural log of fund size
(end-of-year net assets value) in 2009. For the detail definitions of variables, refer to Table 1.

Table 3 describes our dataset. An average trustee board consists of eight trustees with the
maximum size being seventeen seats, similar to past studies (Gupta et al., 2007; Sy et al.,
2008). The overall level of board independence is low in the industry and public sector
superannuation funds. Some trustee boards do not have independent trustees; on average,
there is 9.5% board independence, with a small standard deviation of 0.1730. An average
fund incurred $0.0010 operating expense per dollar of the fund’s total assets per member in
2009, and little change is observed over time: an average of $0.0012 between the period 2005
and 2009. On the other hand, fund membership in the industry and public sector
superannuation funds has enjoyed an average growth of 11.54% between 2005 and 2009,
with 0.03% growth recorded for the year 2009. This is not to say that every fund has grown
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over time, which is indicated by a large standard deviation of 97.61; some funds have seen
their membership shrink. The industry and public sector superannuation funds have
performed well on average across all disclosure indices, with an average of: 3.3/4.0 in board
disclosure (BDI), 3.2/4.0 in investment disclosure (IDI), 3.6/5.0 in fee disclosure (FDI) and
10.2/13.0 in overall disclosure (ODI).
Table 4 shows the correlations between variables. There is evidence to support the
argument that internal governance mechanisms (such as the trustee board) have a relationship
with disclosure practices. First, board size (bsize) has a significant and positive correlation
with all disclosure indices; 0.3350 (ρ < 5%) with ODI, 0.3704 (ρ < 5%) with BDI, 0.2258 (ρ
< 10%) with IDI and 0.2051 (ρ < 10%) with FDI. Second, board independence (pindpt) is
negatively correlated with ODI (-0.2143, ρ < 10%), IDI (-0.2332, ρ < 10%) and FDI (0.2446, ρ < 5%). This is inconsistent with the findings of Arcay and Vázquez (2005) and Gul
and Leung (2009), but supports the argument of a substitution effect between independent
directors and disclosure by Eng and Mak (2003). Fund operating expenses (logopex09) have
significant and negative correlations with disclosure indices, except in the disclosure of
trustee board information (BDI). This may be due to the equal representation rule that
governs trustee board formation and the selection of trustees. In the industry and public sector
superannuation funds with a paternalistic characteristic (Donald, 2011), where directors are
often selected from the pool of members or nominated by employers and industry association,
there may be existing trust in the trustee directorship by fund members; hence, no need arises
to increase the transparency of the trustee structure and directors’ profiles. Nevertheless,
disclosure costs are a serious consideration when it comes to decisions about transparency.
Fund type has no correlation with voluntary disclosure. The correlations between fund size
measured in terms of total asset value and the number of members have mixed results with
the various disclosure indices. Board size is correlated with fund size at the 1% significance
level, while board independence has no correlation with any fund characteristic variables.
This is an indication, perhaps, of a lack of role and contribution by independent trustees on
the oversight of superannuation funds in the current structure.
Table 4: Correlations Table
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1
2
-0.1189
3
-0.1389
0.2832†
4
0.3350^ -0.2143*
-0.1613
5
0.3704^
0.1171
-0.0528
0.8125^
6
0.2258* -0.2332*
-0.1370
0.9191^
0.6502^
7
0.2051*
-0.2446†
-0.1736
0.9194^
0.5928^
0.7842^
8
-0.1714
0.4984^
0.4894^ -0.3161^
0.0149
-0.3814^ -0.3751^
†
†
9
0.4408^
-0.0234
-0.2766
0.3272^
0.2507
0.2325^
0.3395^ -0.4561^
10
0.5464^
-0.1690 -0.3197^
0.2338†
0.1602
0.1630
0.2578† -0.5144^
†
*10%, 5%, ^1% significance level. 1=bsize, 2=pindpt, 3=type, 4=ODI, 5=BDI, 6=IDI, 7=FDI,
8=logopex09, 9=members09, 10=size09
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3.1 Regression Analysis

Our research questions focus on voluntary disclosure in four categories of fund information
in the Australian industry and public sector superannuation funds. We aim to explain what
drives funds to disclose information about their trustee structure and composition, investment
team and strategies, and fee structure.
To test our research question on voluntary disclosure of fund information, we
developed four indices, namely ODI, BDI, IDI and FDI. Please see Table 2 for a detailed
description of each index. Based on our literature review, we developed the following
ordinary least square regression (OLS) model:
Disclosurei = α i + β1typei + β 2 opexi + β 3 bsizei + β 4 pindpt i + β 5 sizei + ε i

(1)

where Disclosure is measured by ODI, BDI, IDI and FDI; type = fund type; opex = operating
expenses, bsize = trustee board size, pindpt = the percentage of independent trustee per fund.
We use two proxies for fund size (size): (1) end-of-year total asset value per fund; (2) end-ofyear total number of members per fund. We found the results between the two proxies are
robust, hence we will only report the first proxy in our following result tables.
Table 5: This table shows the OLS results for Overall Disclosure Index (ODI), Board Disclosure
Index (BDI), Investment Disclosure Index (IDI) and Fee Disclosure Index (FDI). The estimators in
the models include trustee type (type), normalised operating expenses (opex09), board size (bsize) and
board independence percentage (pindpt). Fund size (logsize09) is a control variable. The standard
errors reported in this table are white heteroskedasticity-consistent.
Models
ODI
BDI
IDI
FDI
Variables coef.
t-stat
coef.
t-stat
coef.
t-stat
coef.
t-stat
Constant
9.6937
4.3555
2.3077
3.1964
4.6067
4.5909
2.7793
1.9929
(2.2256^)
(0.7220^)
(1.0034^)
(1.3946†)
type
-0.2454
-0.2207
0.0385
0.1067
-0.0378
-0.0754
-0.2461
-0.3532
(1.1121)
(0.3607)
(0.5014)
(0.6968)
opex09
-2.4601
-3.0978
0.1173
0.4553
-1.4048
3.9235
-1.1726
-2.3564
(0.7941^)
(0.2576)
(0.3580^)
(0.4976†)
bsize
0.1686
1.7801
0.0441
1.4364
0.0900
2.1087
0.0344
0.5800
†
(0.0947*)
(0.0307)
(0.0427 )
(0.0593)
pindpt
0.5780
0.4067
0.3332
0.7228
0.3120
0.4870
-0.0673
-0.0755
(1.4211)
(0.4610)
(0.6407)
(0.8905)
logsize09
0.0264
0.1463
0.0674
1.1521
-0.1183
-1.4554
0.0773
0.6842
(0.1802)
(0.0585)
(0.0813)
(0.1129)
F-value
Adj Rsquared
Ρ
N

1.5517

6.0381

4.2694

0.0407

0.2793

0.2010

0.0002

0.1876

0.0001

0.0022

66

66

66

66

5.9488
0.2757

*10%, †5%, ^1% significance level. Heteroskadasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Table 5 shows the OLS results for the four indices based on equation 1. We report the
heteroskadasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. The results show that the short-term
negative effect (coef.=-2.4601) on overall disclosure (ODI) is significant at the 1% level for
operating expenses. The result is consistent for IDI (coef.= -1.4048, p < 1%; not significant in
the model using fund membership as a fund size’s proxy) and FDI (coef. = -1.1726, p < 5%).
Overall, we found that disclosure costs are the primary factor influencing funds’ disclosure
practices, with a negative relationship between disclosure costs and transparency, supporting
H2. This also supports Simpson’s (2008) notion of a trade-off between disclosure costs and
the potential benefits derived. Board size has a positive effect on ODI (coef. = 0.1686, p <
10%) and IDI (coef. = 0.0900, p < 5%). This supports H3. The combination of expertise and
knowledge, and the dynamics of the working relationships and objectives of individuals may
be different between an equal-presentation selection model and a merit-based selection model
(as seen in the corporate sector); hence, our results diverge from the corporate governance
literature. We do not find that fund type, board independence or fund size influence
disclosure practices. Therefore, H1 and H4 are rejected. Our Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
scores for the estimators are below the threshold of 10; hence, no significant multicollinearity
is present in our models.
3.2 Robustness Tests

We use four additional control variables in our robustness tests. Firstly, accumulation
(accum) is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a fund offers the accumulation option;
otherwise, it is 0. An accumulation option differs from the defined benefit structure in which
fund members can select and change their investment strategy (i.e. conservative, balanced or
aggressive strategy) that they desire at any point in time. The offering of the accumulation
option requires that funds disclose more relevant information to their members to assist the
latter with their decision-making. The number of committees (ncomm) measures the number
of committees that a fund trustee board has. Board committees assist trustees by providing
them with specific areas of expertise and knowledge, thereby enhancing information
collection and sharing in a fund’s governance structure. The percentage of members who are
pensioners (pension09) in a fund affects the investment options and products and operational
costs, resulting in different communication strategies, information types, and collection and
dissemination processes. Lastly, public offer (po) is a binary variable that takes the value of 1
if a fund opens its membership to the public (public offer fund); otherwise, it is 0. Under the
SIS Act 1994, a public offer fund has to meet more stringent requirements in terms of the
establishment of their trustee board, information disclosure to members and prospective
members, and the level of member contribution. Hence, public offers may affect the
voluntary disclosure practices of superannuation funds.
Table 6 shows the results of the robustness tests. We exclude the results for BDI
because none of the models are significant. We found that disclosure costs (operating
expenses) is a reliable and significant factor in explaining voluntary disclosure using ODI,
IDI and FDI. In 10 out of 12 models, it has a negative effect at the 1% significance level on
voluntary disclosure; one model shows a negative effect at the 5% significance level, while
the other shows the same effect, but not significantly. Board size shows a consistently
positive effect on voluntary disclosure in all three indices; however, the significance varies
between 5%, 10%, and not significant at all. Fund type and board independence are both
unreliable and not significant estimators of voluntary disclosure. The signs of their effects
change in different models, yielding inconclusive results. The number of committees displays
reliable positive effect on ODI, IDI and FDI; their significance level varies between 5% and
10% levels. This indicates that the trustee composition that gives rise to a collection of
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expertise and knowledge plays an important role in voluntary disclosure. Pension09 has a
negative and significant effect on ODI, IDI and FDI, with levels of between 1% and 5%.
This indicates that a higher proportion of pensioners in a fund leads to lower voluntary
disclosure. Public offer are significant at 1% with a positive effect on FDI, supporting the
notion that by opening to public membership, funds are more proactive in disclosing
information - in this case, about fees - to members and prospective members. Other control
variables are found to have no significant effect on voluntary disclosure and their signs of
effect are arbitrary.
4. DISCUSSION
Many past disclosure studies focus on the level of disclosure and how it affects firm value
and investor behaviours. Derived from both Accounting and Finance literature, we explain
what drives disclosure practices. We find voluntary disclosure of fund product information is
affected by disclosure costs and, to a lesser extent, fund governance. Disclosure costs
measured in terms of operating expenses has a significant and reliable influence over
voluntary disclosure. Specifically, higher disclosure costs lead to a lower level of disclosure.
Given that there is an increasing number of fund mergers over time in the Australian
superannuation industry, funds are developing economies of scale in terms of membership
and operating costs. Therefore, funds consider the trade-off between potential benefits and
disclosure costs seriously and are able to manage the balance more effectively. Trustee board
structure has less influence than trustee board composition in determining the level of
voluntary disclosure. Trustee board structure measured by board size is to a large extent
determined by fund size and the equal-representation rule in the nomination of trustees. This
may deteriorate the natural effect of trustee board structure on voluntary disclosure as those
seen in the corporate sector. Although we did not measure the profile and background of
individual trustee, the number of board committees serves as a close proxy of trustee board
composition and show significant positive effect on voluntary disclosure. This implies that
the dynamics and interplay of expertise and knowledge among trustees in influencing
decision-making are as important as in a corporate board of directors. More thorough
research is required in this area.
We also demonstrate that different factors drive specific types of information. This
supports the disclosure and information efficiency literature, which argues that the sharing of
information is driven by the private objectives, abilities and constraints of the information
holder (Verrecchia, 1983; Stiglitz, 1979; Darrough & Stoughton, 1990; Gigler, 1994). We
also show that the recipient of information may have a role in influencing the level and type
of information that is disclosed. Our results show that the disclosure of fees is influenced by
whether a fund is open to public membership. The disclosure of fees could be viewed by fund
members to assess how efficiently a fund is being run. In not-for-profit entities, it is found
that fund sponsors are mostly trusting about reported costs, especially in not scrutinising
various classifications of ‘joint-costs’, such as those involved with fundraising, educational
materials, and other operating expenses (Khumawala et al., 2005). Members in Australian
superannuation funds may trust their trustees to act in their best interests under the
paternalistic governance arrangement through the equal representation rule of trustee
nomination. This, in turn, influences the type and quality of information being shared by the
funds.
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Table 6: This table shows the robustness test results using OLS for Overall Disclosure Index (ODI),
Investment Disclosure Index (IDI) and Fee Disclosure Index (FDI). The results for Board Disclosure
Index (BDI) are not reported due to the insignificance of all of the estimation models. The estimators
in the models include trustee type (type), normalised operating expenses (opex09), board size (bsize)
and board independence percentage (pindpt). Fund size (logsize09) is a control variable. Additional
control variables are introduced separately in four models (1-4) to test the robustness of the
estimators. The additional control variables include accum (dummy variable with 1 indicates that a
fund has accumulation product; 0 otherwise); ncomm (the number of committees that a trustee board
has); pension09 (the percentage of pension fund members in a fund); and po (dummy variable with 1
indicates that a fund has public offer; 0 otherwise). Only significant control variables are reported in
the table. The standard errors reported in this table are white heteroskedasticity-consistent.
ODI
type
opex09
bsize
pindpt
logsize09
ncomm
pension09
Adj. R-sq.
Model p-value
N
IDI
type
opex09
bsize
pindpt
logsize09
ncomm
pension09
Adj. R-sq.
Model p-value
N
FDI
type
opex09
bsize
pindpt
logsize09
ncomm
pension09
po
Adj. R-sq.
Model p-value
N

(1) accum

(2) ncomm

(3) pension09

(4) po

(+), not significant
(-), p < 1%
(+), p < 10%
(+), not significant
(-), not significant

(+), not significant
(-), p < 1%
(+), not significant
(-), not significant
(-), not significant

(+), not significant
(-), p < 1%
(+), not significant
(-), not significant
(+), not significant

(+), not significant
(-), p < 1%
(+), p < 10%
(+), not significant
(-), not significant

-

(+), p < 10%
0.5257
0.0000
46

(-), p < 1%
0.3241
0.0000
62

-

(-), not significant
(-), p < 1%
(+), p < 10%
(+), not significant
(-), not significant
0.2682
0.0004
66

(-), not significant
(-), p < 1%
(+), p < 10%
(+), not significant
(-), p < 10%
(+), p < 10%
0.5505
0.0000
46

(+), not significant
(-), p < 1%
(+), p < 10%
(+), not significant
(-), not significant
(-), p < 1%
0.2831
0.0003
62

(-), not significant
(-), p < 1%
(+), p < 5%
(+), not significant
(-), not significant
0.2738
0.0003
66

(-), not significant
(-), p < 5%
(+), not significant
(-), not significant
(+), not significant
0.1916
0.0044
66

(-), not significant
(-), not significant
(+), not significant
(-), p < 5%
(+), p < 5%
(+), p < 5%
0.4036
0.0001
46

(+), not significant
(-), p < 1%
(+), not significant
(-), not significant
(+), not significant
(-), p < 5%
0.3776
0.0000
62

(-), not significant
(-), p < 1%
(+), not significant
(-), not significant
(-), not significant
(+), p < 1%
0.2515
0.0006
66

0.2650
0.0004
66

0.2764
0.0003
66

The multi-layer agency relationship in the superannuation funds industry may have a
significant impact on the level and quality of information being disclosed. Our results show
that the explanatory power of board size on voluntary disclosure may be restricted by the
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equal-representation nomination rule. Therefore, disclosure is also driven by the institutional
environment in which an entity is operating. In addition, the equal representation of
employer- and employee-nominated directors undermines the role of independent trustees in
the Australian superannuation funds. Trustees in public sector and larger funds tend to be
more conformed in their beliefs and resistant to radical change (Gupta et al., 2007). Our
evidence demonstrates that board independence has no influence on disclosure practices.
Although some may argue that improving disclosure may not mitigate agency conflicts in the
superannuation funds industry (Stewart & Yermo, 2008), it is indisputable that disclosure
practices are important ways for funds to communicate with members and the market, and an
important source of information for product comparison and performance assessment. Via
disclosure, market experts can also assess the credibility of the information providers and
their associated agents (Gigler, 1994).
5. CONCLUSION
Our paper focuses on explaining what drives the disclosure of different types of product
information in Australian industry and public sector superannuation funds. Our findings
about the factors influencing voluntary disclosure of superannuation funds’ product
information shed light on the presence of agency conflicts and the future development of
transparency in the industry. We draw on Accounting and Finance literature by combining
the issues of proprietary information, disclosure costs and fund governance to develop our
research model. Four disclosure indices examining the information disclosure of fund
governance, investment, fees, and overall practices are developed and used in our regression
models. We found evidence to support the hypotheses that disclosure costs and fund
governance affect voluntary disclosure based on the type of disclosed information.
The Australian superannuation funds industry is segregated by fund type (that is, industry,
public sector, corporate, retail, and self-managed funds). Hence, this results in inter-type and
intra-type competition among the funds. This gives rise to a complex combination of
proprietary costs for disclosure. Disclosure costs in terms of operating expenses have a
significant and negative effect on disclosure practices. The size of the trustee board has a
significant positive but weak impact on disclosure, while board independence, which is
restricted by current institutional factors, has mixed results on voluntary disclosure.
Our study faced limitations in the availability of information about the Australian
superfunds industry, and this had implications for the research methodologies we could
employ to derive in-depth analyses. Nevertheless, we have provided a unique view of the
superannuation industry and their levels of disclosure. We support the Cooper Review’s
(2010) view that governance is crucial in the operation of superannuation funds, including
their disclosure practices. We highlight that trustee board composition, which affects the
dynamic play between individual trustee’s expertise and experience, plays a more significant
role in voluntary disclosure than the trustee board structure. In addition, disclosure is driven
by the institutional environment, the selection process of trustees and structure of funds (such
as whether a fund is open to the public). In their effort to promote market competition and
improve fund comparability, policy-makers must take into consideration the endogenous and
exogenous factors that affect funds’ disclosure practices. A standardised disclosure
framework may improve comparability between funds, but this should not lead to a
prescriptive governance framework across all funds as each fund possesses unique
characteristics and structures. Therefore, funds should be allowed some flexibility to
implement governance practices that are relevant to them, but be required to disclose
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information in a systematic format to enhance information symmetry in the industry. Further
directions for research in this area could address understandings of trustee governance and
their impact on fund returns and risk management.
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